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Abstract. The UK government recently commissioned a research study to 
identify the state-of-the-art in Critical Infrastructure modelling and analysis, 
and the government/industry requirements for such tools and services. This 
study (Cetifs) concluded with a strategy aiming to bridge the gaps between the 
capabilities and requirements, which would establish interdependency analysis 
as a commercially viable service in the near future. This paper presents the 
findings of this study that was carried out by CSR, City University London, 
Adelard LLP, a safety/security consultancy and Cranfield University, defense 
academy of the UK. 
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1 Introduction 
The UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), the Technology 
Strategy Board (TSB) and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) commissioned a feasibility study to identify the state-of-the-art in Critical 
Infrastructure (CI) interdependency modelling and analysis and to develop a strategy 
for research and practice, aiming to bridge the gaps between existing capabilities and 
Government/industry requirements.  
The study, carried out by the Centre for Software Reliability of City University, 
London, Cranfield University, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom and Adelard 
LLP resulted in two publically available reports:  
- The ‘main’ report [1], which presents the overview of capabilities, 
requirements and the proposed strategy. 
- A secondary report [2], which is an introductory research review in the areas 
of modeling, analysis and visualization of infrastructure interdependencies. 
This paper will briefly present the study, discuss some of its findings, and 
conclude with the proposed strategy. 
2 Background: The Cetifs study 
The Cetifs (CPNI, EPSRC, TSB Interdependency analysis Feasibility Study) 
methodology comprised the following activities:  
1. Analysis of two recent major UK multi-infrastructure disasters: The 
Buncefield explosion [4] and the 2007 floods [5]. 
2. Consultations with a wide a range of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) 
stakeholders (government, industry and academia)  
3. A review of research specific to modeling and analysis of dependencies in CIs 
(in a separate report, [2]). 
4. A questionnaire survey based on the three previous activities distributed to 
utility companies IT and security departments  
The Buncefield explosion 
The explosion that took place at the oil storage depot located in Buncefield in 
December 2005 has been characterized as the biggest explosion in peacetime Europe. 
The explosion affected the operation of multiple infrastructures (energy distribution, 
transportation, information infrastructure, finance, health as well as the environment). 
This incident is of particular importance as it unveiled some important issues with 
regard to information infrastructures (II).  
We mainly focused our analysis on an IT company/data centre named Northgate 
Information Solutions, which was severely affected by the explosion. The servers that 
were at these premises hosted patient records and admission/discharge for a number 
of hospitals in the area, a North London payroll scheme of approximately £1.4 billion, 
and systems/data for several local authorities [4] among others. 
The 2007 floods 
The floods that struck much of the country during June and July 2007 were 
extreme, affecting hundreds of thousands of people in England and Wales. It was the 
most serious inland flood since 1947 [5]. 13 people lost their lives, approximately 
48,000 households and nearly 7,300 businesses were flooded and billions of pounds 
of damage were claimed. In Yorkshire and Humberside, the Fire and Rescue Service 
launched the “biggest rescue effort in peacetime Britain”.  
The floods affected multiple infrastructures, such as water and food supply, power, 
telecommunications and transportation, as well as agriculture and tourism. Many 
businesses also suffered flooded sales premises, together with damage to stock and 
equipment. 
Incident analysis conclusions 
The analysis of these incidents helped us to understand some of the challenges that 
infrastructure owners and the government are facing. We found that there are several 
issues which, although they are known, they are not well understood. These served as 
a basis for our consultations and were the following: 
Geographical dependencies are, to a certain extent, known, as the identification of 
physical proximity of assets is straightforward, especially when we consider an area 
surrounding a plant or within a flood-vulnerable area. Nonetheless, there were several 
surprises in these events (e.g., during the floods, several critical services had to be 
shut down for precaution in case the flood reached them but there was uncertainty as 
to whether that was actually needed or not). There are also more complex and indirect 
consequences (e.g., the effect the Buncefield explosion had on the adjacent business 
park and the data centre in particular was also deemed as a surprise). 
Competition for resources. This challenge arises during an incident and can also 
lead to interdependencies or further cascade effects. Capacity and bandwidth of 
resources are known to infrastructure owners; however, during crises they may be 
reached very quickly, and in unusual ways. Competition for resources can also 
manifest when an asset that provides a resource is lost (e.g. a power station), where 
other dependent nodes will have to find alternative suppliers.  
Long term effects. In some cases, major incidents can involve significant long term 
loses to infrastructure and economy by complex cascade paths. One typical aspect of 
this is the effect a disaster can have on tourism. In the Pitt review there was an 
extended discussion on the role of media following the floods and the long-term effect 
on tourism and the economy of affected areas. Although there are a number of studies 
in macro-economic impact of infrastructure failures, the long term effects of such 
disasters and how they can be controlled are aspects that are not well understood and 
require more detailed analysis, considering various parameters such as the role of 
media. 
We also concluded that there is a lack of empirical data to support in-depth 
analyses that will help us understand interdependencies better. This is due to the 
comparative rarity of events, and the difficulty in attaining data from multiple 
organizations, with many incidents going unreported or kept as anecdotes within one 
infrastructure. As part of this study and continuing work with TNO [7] we are 
analyzing the implications of their large infrastructure incident database [1]. 
2.3 Consultations and questionnaire survey 
The consultations formed the biggest part of this study; in particular, we carried out 
semi-structured interviews with: 
- Parts of the UK government that are concerned with the prevention of and 
response to major CNI disruptions, resulting either from attack or natural 
disaster. These consultations helped us formulate the context of the study and 
the requirements that Interdependency Analysis (IA) services would have to 
satisfy. 
- Private companies and research institutions that develop tools or use them to 
offer services that can assist in the identification of interdependency 
vulnerabilities. These stakeholders provided us the understanding of what the 
state-of-the-art is, and what capabilities can be offered currently. 
Before discussing the requirements and capabilities, we ought to present the 
different perspectives that stakeholders have as these perspectives pose different sets 
of requirements and interests in IA. These perspectives have been organized around 
the concept of resilience, as it provides a useful framework within which to consider 
different stakeholder approaches, requirements and responsibilities for CI services. 
Perspectives on CNI resilience 
Interdependencies are often discussed as a source of threat to systems. Indeed this 
can be the case and in particular unforeseen interdependencies can be a source of 
surprise and uncertainty in our ability to understand risks and system behavior.  
However interdependency is also central to providing tolerance to attack and failure, a 
means for adaptation and overall resilience.   
The loss of system capacity due to an incident can be seen as an indication of how 
resilient a system can be. This viewpoint is shared by the US Department for 
Homeland Security (DHS) and UK Resilience. This resilience perspective is shown in 
Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Resilience 
However in [6] the emphasis is on the ability of a system to adapt and respond to 
changes in the environment. In a recent report for the Defense Science and 
Technology Laboratory (DSTL) [3] produced by CSR, City University London, two 
types of resilience were distinguished: 
- Type 1: Resilience to design basis threats. This could be expressed in the usual 
terms of availability, robustness, etc.; 
- Type 2: Resilience to beyond design basis threats. This might be split into 
those known threats that are considered incredible or ignored for some reason 
and other threats that are unknowns.  
Some policies consider an “all hazards” approach that addresses both malicious 
and accidental attacks on systems. In addition, the notion of dependability, or 
dependability and security, as an umbrella term is useful to capture the need to 
address all attributes (safety, security, availability etc.) rather than just a single 
attribute. 
The overall service level view is summarized in Table 1 below: 
Table 1. Phases of resilience 
Phase Action to increase resilience 
Preparation 
and learning 
Reduce frequency of events by early warning and upstream 
measures. 
Provide early warning, operator support. 
Learning from experience (major incidents, minor mishaps, near 
misses), training. 
Initial loss Increased robustness by 
- Network design addressing topology, redundancy, diversity. 
- Classification of critical nodes and suitable hardening. 
- Understanding of events and scenarios 
Detection  
 
Communication between services. 
Variety of forecasting approaches. 
Detection of compromises. 
Decision  
 
Situational awareness. 
Planning and training (scenarios) and use of synthetic environments. 
Recovery  
 
Resource deployment; dependent assets identified  
- Awareness state of other networks. 
- Communication and co-ordination. 
 
The different stakeholders all had an interest in resilience but had very different 
emphases. Broadly speaking these concerned the scope of their responsibilities, 
whether it was: 
- All hazards approach: all hazards are considered, including both natural 
disasters and malicious attacks;  
- Security and vulnerability focus: identification of security critical assets and 
consideration of vulnerabilities/threats to them; 
- Natural hazard focus: only considers events such as floods/earthquakes and 
their effect on CNI; 
And also the overall purpose of their analyses e.g. 
- Identification of vulnerabilities (dependencies) in stable system state; 
- Incident response, i.e., control of the incident and evacuation and coordination 
of emergency services; 
- Long-term effects and recovery e.g., environmental, financial. 
We can use the resilience-dependability framework to capture the different 
perspectives of stakeholders. For example, those of CPNI and the UK Home Office 
Civil Contingency Secretariat (CCS) are shown in the table below. 
Table 2. CPNI and CCS perspectives 
Framework component Stakeholder: CPNI Stakeholder: CCS 
What services are 
addressed? 
All within scope of NI 
suitably prioritized.  
All 
Which dependability 
attributes are concerned? 
Classic security attributes – 
confidentiality, integrity, 
availability. 
Emphasis on availability.  
What range of hazards/ 
threats? 
Security related only. Natural hazards in terms 
of initiation.  
Advice from CPNI on 
security.  
All hazards in decision 
and recovery phases. 
Which resilience phase? Emphasis on prevention 
and preparation and 
learning phase.  
Advice to CCS during 
incidents. 
National risk assessment 
deals with long term 
losses. 
Emphasis on recovery and 
incident response. 
What services are 
addressed? 
All within scope of NI 
suitably prioritized.  
All 
 
A security evaluation could then be seen as evaluation of resilience for certain 
threats (e.g. malicious ones) and for certain attributes (confidentiality, integrity, 
availability). The evaluation of the security part of resilience would then address the 
different stages of Table 2. 
In this study we were particularly interested in (inter-) dependencies, and so we 
can use the framework to assess what dependability attributes, what resilience phase 
and what threat scope is of concern and being addressed by particular modelling and 
analysis approaches.  
Questionnaire survey 
We further explored these issues with a small questionnaire survey that was 
targeted at utility companies IT and security managers. 
From the responses we have received, we found that utility companies address the 
challenges of infrastructure interdependencies by ensuring close relationships with 
suppliers and vendors. They believe that close relationships can assist in 
understanding the various risks associated with their providers’ failure and their 
overall level of resilience. Risks are monitored through internal risk review groups, 
and company boards oversee the results. Also in some cases utilities hold industry 
forums to exchange information, or engage in regular review meetings. Exercises 
involving suppliers have also been carried out. In some cases, alternative providers 
have already been sourced as part of contingency planning.   
However, the protective measures to be taken depend on the nature of the risk or 
vulnerability and on the particular department. Overall, utility companies focus on 
improving resilience by having business continuity planning, frequent risk 
assessment, back up systems (especially for IT), as well as security technologies. 
Although infrastructure dependencies are considered in risk assessment, this is 
mostly done in more traditional ways, without tool support. In one case, it was 
suggested that mapping software was used, although just once, for examining 
proximity of functions to cable routes. In addition, none of the respondents were 
aware of any technical documentation, research or conferences in infrastructure 
interdependency, something which perhaps suggests the presence of a gap between 
research and practice. 
Most responders suggested they had experienced either minor or major disruptions 
due to failure of other infrastructure providers.  
The questionnaire also probed whether there was scope for some form of IA as a 
distinct service.  There was no clear consensus from respondents; some believed it 
could be, and some suggested they would be interested if it was part of a wider, risk 
assessment service. The issues of trust and confidentiality were raised as serious 
obstacles. 
2.4 Research review 
The models and simulations developed to support infrastructure modelling and 
simulation are diverse and complementary. There are multiple ways in which these 
models are related and there is no single taxonomy or classification that suits all 
purposes.  
In the review we focus on the results of the models to provide a basis for 
describing relationships between them. The classification of modelling activities from 
this perspective, applied in particular to models, tools and methodologies is provided 
in [2]. This includes:  
- Abstraction level and model boundaries: Questions such as “how much of the 
real world should be modelled?” constrain modelling methodology and the 
applicability of modelling results. A continuum of possibilities exists ranging 
from high-fidelity (very detailed) simulations to mid-range and low-fidelity 
models;  
- Technique and underlying theory: (Inter)dependency analysis of complex 
systems has been recognized as an inherently interdisciplinary activity. There 
exists a wealth of experience and knowledge relevant for (inter)dependency 
modelling. This column in the table below gives information about established 
formalisms, theory and techniques used in building and analyzing the models; 
- Model applicability: The type of problems where the model can provide useful 
support is indicated in this column and the extent of tool support.  
The incident analysis, the consultations and the questionnaire survey helped us to 
formulate the requirements, while the research review and again the consultations 
helped us to evaluate the state-of-the-art, the current capabilities. Capabilities and 
requirements are discussed in the following two sections. 
3 Initial requirements 
From our discussions with stakeholders we concluded that: 
1. There is recognition that interdependencies are part of wider issues of 
understanding infrastructure interaction. 
2. They are concerned that they lack knowledge of infrastructure interactions. 
3. There is sufficient expert judgment, anecdotes and incident analysis to suggest 
that this lack of knowledge may present a significant risk or a missed 
opportunity for improving resilience at all stage of the resilience lifecycle. 
4. They see many potential advantages in a more sophisticated approach to 
infrastructure modelling but at present they do not know under what 
circumstance these uncertainties are significant and so can not justify the 
required investments.  
In discussion with stakeholders we identified requirements across various areas 
that relate to infrastructure interdependencies. These areas are the following: 
- Inherent infrastructure resilience—scope and overall methodology: 
Perspectives here address the level of resilience that is built in to 
infrastructures and normal operation. 
- Infrastructure analysis and support: The consultation identified a number of 
different possible service delivery perspectives. 
- Hazard and vulnerability identification and management: Perspectives vary 
on the scope of hazards to be addressed or the approach to the management of 
systems. 
- Resilience phases: Potential capabilities and requirements that concern the 
various phases of resilience. 
- Critical information infrastructures: A greater focus is given in this study to 
CII. 
- Dependability of the modelling: An integral part the development of tools and 
analytical services is to ensure that they are dependable. There will be a need 
to trust the results of infrastructure modelling and analysis and possibly 
integrate information from a variety of trusted and less trusted sources. There 
will therefore be a variety of confidentiality requirements on the modelling 
tools and supporting IT infrastructure depending on their application and mode 
of service delivery. Unless these confidentiality requirements are met the 
modelling activity could provide a threat. 
- Evidence of costs and potential benefits: Cost and benefit issues have to do 
with costs of failure and benefits of IA. 
4 Current capabilities 
Providers of infrastructure modelling and/or (inter-) dependency analysis are either 
government-endorsed organizations, or leading private technology solutions 
providers. Overall, they offer a diverse range of services. Our consultations have 
aimed at understanding their capabilities and market deployment approaches. These 
will then be related with, and contrasted to, the initial requirements in section 3. 
Figure 2 presents the components that we have considered in this study (see [2] for 
more detail). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Modelling components 
These components are explained as follows: 
Data, information and knowledge. This refers to the data that is fed into the 
simulation. Data can be either static or live. For instance, simulators are often linked 
to live weather feeds, GPS and other forms of live data sources. Data acquisition and 
verification are important challenges as insufficient, incorrect or inaccurate data can 
result in a misleading analysis. 
Federation refers to the integration of several simulations (federates). This is 
primarily done through achieving interoperability among separately developed 
simulators. Standardization is required in order to define common elements. 
Infrastructure models. Modelling within a single infrastructure or system is a 
diverse and mature field. Models are fundamental to understanding system behavior, 
evaluating risks and designing operational strategies. 
Interdependency modelling can be considered according to the different perceived 
layers (e.g. of physical, control and supervisory management) and also in terms of a 
range of abstractions from high-level services to detailed implementations. For each 
of these abstractions, there are a wide range of possible modelling approaches and 
theories that can be deployed, ranging from qualitative models, stochastic activity 
networks to complexity science style models and high-fidelity simulations. These can 
be deployed at a varying levels of detail, e.g. to model the detailed implementation 
topology or to model the service topology and cascading effects. 
Methodology. A defined and structured approach can assist in an efficient and 
effective modelling and analysis. The methodology contains aspects of requirement 
elicitation, data gathering and analysis, modelling, simulation and the eventual 
development of conclusions and decision support.  
Scenarios and threats. Scenario development considers situations and sequences of 
events that are of particular concern, in order to identify threats and gain insight of the 
‘system’ behavior under hazardous conditions. In most cases, a ‘reasonably’ worst 
case scenario is needed in order to focus planning and mitigation against a threat that 
has a realistic likelihood of occurring. 
Simulators. Simulation is the imitation of some real thing, state of affairs, or 
process. There are many different types of computer simulation—the common feature 
they all share is the attempt to generate a sample of representative scenarios for a 
model in which a complete enumeration of all possible states would be prohibitive or 
impossible. 
Visualization refers to the graphical representation of the modelling and analysis. 
This can be either on a standalone PC screen, or on large, operating room screens, or 
over a set of various screen types, sometimes even distributed across various 
locations. Geographical Information Systems (GIS) are a typical example of 
visualization. In IA, visualization tends to be layered, with several filtering options to 
guide decision support and communication. 
5 The importance of “intangible” infrastructures 
One significant result from our consultations is the importance of “soft” intangible 
critical infrastructures, e.g. trust and confidence within society both in their own right 
and as an important component that is essential to the functioning of critical services. 
For instance, trust between individuals, between individuals and organizations and 
between these and the representative of the state is essential for the delivery of 
service. This, as with so many of the infrastructures, is often hidden but comes to the 
fore in times of crisis and recovery from disaster.  
Trust is an asset that can be built-up, destroyed, squandered and undermined as 
with so many other assets and resources. If we are to assess interdependencies we 
need to take into account these essential yet softer aspects and their relationship to the 
more tangible aspects. Such assessment should appreciate that these soft aspects are 
just as much the target of security threats as the more obvious physical and cyber 
systems. Indeed, it may be that a patient and well read adversary would have a 
strategy that targets these assets. For example, the financial infrastructure relies very 
heavily on trust in the banking system for it to function at all. Witness the latest credit 
crunch, the Northern Rock bank crisis and also public trust in government 
announcements and the panic buying of petrol because people did not believe 
assurances about supply. An adversary strategy that relies on people legitimately 
taking their money out of a bank is far more effective than any physical raid on the 
bank (unless one wants to get rich). At a micro-level, social engineering attacks that 
exploit people’s willingness to give passwords away can be seen as a form of attack 
exploiting confidence. 
While in the past the soft infrastructure might have been separable from the more 
technical infrastructures they are clearly related. Trust in the competence of 
government and authorities is dependent on how well they cope with crises and 
incidents in both the physical and soft infrastructures. Moreover trust relationships 
that citizens have between themselves, organizations, government and agencies are 
strongly dependent on the information infrastructure: a trend that is likely to increase 
(see the UK transformational government agenda [8]). 
Assets such as trust and privacy within society are important and can be seen as 
emergent properties; although they are affected by local aspects of trust they have a 
complex relationship to localized issues. Trust in organizations and government may 
exhibit the classic complex systems phenomenon of rapid transitions and “tipping 
points”. 
Understanding the role of trust and confidence in the protection of CI to the extent 
where it can be taken into account in CI modelling is arguably a great challenge. This 
is an active research area (e.g. [10]) but, most work is focused on the application of 
trust models for the development of trusted IT networks, e.g. for information sharing, 
but the wider implications of trust seem to be under investigated currently. 
6 A proposed strategy 
The final part of the study was a gap analysis between the requirements and 
capabilities identified (as discussed in sections 3 and 4 respectively) to identify 
whether further research and development might be required, and if so, what form it 
should take. 
IA needs a sufficiently rich model for the analysis to discover and assess the risks: 
- Societal aspects need assessment as they provide possible hidden sources of 
commonality; 
- Modes of operation have to be rich enough. These should include degraded 
modes of operation as they can amplify risks as levels of redundancy assumed 
at design time become defeated; 
- Non-linearities in failure models (e.g. increased failure rates due to stress from 
nodes in the same locality) can lead to escalation and cascading effects. 
We have identified four main potential capabilities: 
- To provide specialized security analysts with a means for the assessment of 
interactions and interdependencies; 
- To provide off-line support for risk assessors both aggregators of risk (as at 
CCS) and also individual infrastructure owners to evaluate the impact of 
dependencies and interdependencies; 
- To provide off-line support for risk assessors both aggregators of risk and also 
individual infrastructure owners to evaluate the impact of dependencies and 
interdependencies during incidents (soft real-time);  
- To provide real-time, decision support integrated command and control 
systems (hard real-time) that takes fully into account the impact of 
dependencies and interdependencies. 
To address the required capabilities and gaps that we have identified the study 
proposed the following: 
Trial state-of-the-art and emerging research. Develop and trial modelling 
approaches and decision-support tools and methodologies at various levels of detail. 
The trials would consider both qualitative approaches and off-line, soft real time and 
hard real-time infrastructure interactions. The modelling would consider functional, 
topological and probabilistic approaches.  The trial should be sufficiently complex to 
enable scalability issues to be addressed and consider a number of different 
infrastructure mixes e.g.: 
- Energy distribution (e.g. gas, electricity); 
- Information infrastructures; 
- Soft intangible infrastructures (e.g. trust, confidence). 
The output of the exercise would be experience with the modelling approaches, 
assessment of costs/benefits and way forward and provide more clarity in current and 
future stakeholder requirements. 
Real-time environment provide particular challenges and these should be addressed 
separately. Consider proposed future of decision support systems for key stakeholders 
and develop more detailed requirements to integrate interdependency approach. 
Develop an interoperability approach to infrastructure modelling and analysis (e.g. 
by use of standards, interoperabilities, published Application Programming Interfaces 
(APIs)).  This should promote both innovation and also a more componentized 
approach. Interoperability should cover behavioral models, topologies and associated 
data. Data costs can be significant and interoperability can provide an approach to 
amortizing data costs across applications.  
Provide policy support and evidence base. Provide justification and focus of the 
programme, emphasizing the benefits and responsibilities for all stakeholders.  
Define credible business models taking into account the fact that infrastructure and 
interdependency modelling has particularly close coupling to policy and to sensitive 
areas of risk assessment. 
Offer knowledge transfer and coordination. Promote the research base and offer 
connection to practice by enabling interaction (e.g. via knowledge transfer activities), 
addressing costs of research and methodologies and developing a challenging 
research agenda.  
Within each of these threads both natural hazards and security vulnerabilities need 
to be considered (e.g. by the emphasis in different scenarios). 
7 Conclusion 
This paper presented an overview of a study that was carried out by the Centre for 
Software Reliability of City University, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of 
the United Kingdom and Adelard LLP. 
The study was based on consultations with a wide a range of Critical National 
Infrastructure (CNI) stakeholders (government, industry and academia) and a review 
of research specific to modelling, analyzing and overall understanding dependencies 
in infrastructures [1],[2]. The consultations and the research review identified to 
potential capabilities that would address current requirements and proposed a strategy 
aiming at achieving the capabilities that were identified as currently feasible. 
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